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Article 3

ESSAY
TOWARD A ]REVISED MODEL OF ATTORNEYCLIENT RELATIONSHIP: THE ARGUMENT
FOR AUTONOMY
MARCY STRAUSSt

To manipulate human beings even thoughfor their own good is to deny
their human essence, to treat them as objects without wills of their own
and therefore to degrade them. 1
In any legalproceeding the relationshipbetween a client and his or
her attorney is of great importance. In this Essay ProfessorStrauss examines the nature of the attorney-client relationshipin today's society.
Professor Strauss notes that despite the integral role played by attorneys
in the development of an informed consent model in the medicalprofession, no such model has been applied to the legalprofession. Professor
Strauss argues that the current allocation of decisionmaking authority
between attorney and client is inappropriate;on too many matters the
attorney is grantedexclusive decisionmaking authority. She challenges
this current allocation of decisionmaking authority and arguesfor an
alternative allocation based on the informed consent model Professor
Strauss explores the principle of autonomy as the basis for shifting increaseddecisionmaking authority to the client. She concludes by considering-andrejecting-variousarguments against applying an informed
consent model to the legalprofession.
INTRODUCTION

Beginning in the 1950s attorneys were instrumental in structuring a significant change in the relationship between doctors and patients. Traditionally, a
doctor was neither required nor expected to provide the patient full, if any, information regarding the patient's ailment or possible treatment. 2 Patients were
t Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. J.D. 1981, Georgetown University Law
Center; B.S. 1978, Northwestern University. I wish to thank Erwin Chemerinsky for his helpful
comments on a previous draft of this manuscript. Thanks are also owed to Lisa K. Rozzano and
Barbara A. Horowitz for their excellent research assistance.
1. I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 138 (1969).
2. See Burt, Attorney-Client Trust, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1045 (1981). The Hippocratic writings,
for example, advocated concealing information about the patient's future or present condition:
Perform [these duties calmly] and adroitly, concealing most things from the patient while
you are attending to him. Give necessary orders with cheerfulness and serenity, turning his
attention away from what is being done to him; sometimes reprove sharply and emphatically, and sometimes comfort with solicitude and attention, revealing nothing of the patient's future or present condition.
HIPPOCRATES, Decorum, in HIPPOCRATES 297, 299 (W.H.S. Jones trans. 2d ed. 1967), quoted in
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discouraged from challenging their doctors' orders and instead were expected to

"trust" the physicians' professional "expertise." ' 3 The judicial acceptance of an
"informed consent" doctrine, however, changed the traditional doctor-patient

relationship. 4 Today, before a physician administers any treatment, the patient
must be adequately informed about the proposed treatment and its potential
5
effects, and the patient must consent to the treatment.

The notion of informed consent is historically rooted in the principle of selfdetermination. Self-determination necessarily includes the right to make deci-

sions about one's body. As one court noted:
[E]ach man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, if
he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving

surgery, or other medical treatment. A doctor might well believe that
an operation or form of treatment is desirable or necessary but the law
does not permit him to substitute his own judgment for that of the
6
patient ....
Ironically, despite the legal profession's commitment to the concept of selfKatz, Disclosure and Consent, Search of Their Roots, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 11 124 (1980);
accord Callahan, Morality and Contemporary Culture: The President's Commission & Beyond, 6
CARDOZO L. REV. 347, 349 (1984) ("Throughout most of the history of medicine, the doctor/patient relationship was marked by paternalism on the part of physicians and unquestioning passivity
on the part of patients.").
3. That patients historically trusted their doctors' "expertise" is amazing given that as late as
the nineteenth century anyone could enroll in medical school, and many who did could barely read
and write. It was only in 1910 that Columbia University became the first school to require that
entering medical students be high school graduates. See J. KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR
AND PATIENT 35 (1984).
Ironically, now that there is a high level of skill, education, and expertise required of doctors,
decisions made by these professionals are being challenged.
4. The first judicial opinion to use the phrase "informed consent" was Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957). In Salgo the court held
that a doctor must disclose all facts necessary for the patient's intelligent consent. Id. at 578, 317
P.2d at 181. Given the criticism of the concept of informed consent by much of the medical profession, it is ironic that the paragraph discussing informed consent in Salgo was taken verbatim from
the amicus brief submitted by the American College of Surgeons. Id.; see J. K=rZ, supra note 3, at
35; Pernick, The Patient'sRole in MedicalDecision-Making: A Social History ofInformed Consentin
Medical Therapy, in 3 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 1 (1982) (Presi-

dent's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine & Biomedical & Behavioral Research)
[hereinafter MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS].
5. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
Canterbury is a landmark case in which the court discussed in detail all facets of the informed
consent doctrine. The court noted that
[t]rue consent to what happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that
entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon each. The average patient has little or no understanding of the medical arts,
and ordinarily has only his physician to whom he can look for enlightenment with which to
reach an intelligent decision. From these almost axiomatic considerations springs the need,
and in turn the requirement of a reasonable divulgence by physician to patient to make
such a decision possible.
Id. at 780.
Numerous authors have explored the concept of informed consent in medicine. See, eg., R.
FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986); 3. KATZ,
supra note 3; J. LUDLAM, INFORMED CONSENT (1978); A. RosoFF, INFORMED CONSENT: A
GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS (1981).

6. Nathanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406-07, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960).
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determination, and despite the integral role played by attorneys in the development of an informed consent doctrine for the medical profession, the informed
consent model has not been applied to the legal profession. Although rhetoric
supporting full communication between attorney and client, and client consent
to "important" decisions in the lawsuit exists, 7 in practice the allocation of decisionmaking authority is quite different from that envisioned under an informed
consent doctrine. Given that "[1]awyers seem to be the chief protagonists of
'consumer-oriented' informed consent in medicine ...it is startling how small a
part informed consent plays in legal practice."'8 In short, attorneys retain significant control over much of the lawsuit, reserving few decisions for the client.
Although informed consent has existed in the medical field for over twenty
years, only in recent years has it been suggested that attorneys should "heal
thyselves" and adopt such a model.9 A systematic study of the desirability of
such a change is necessary because the allocation of decisionmaking authority
between client and attorney raises profound practical and philosophical questions. On a practical level, it is difficult to imagine an issue having a more significant impact on an attorney's day-to-day practice, regardless of specialty or
areas of interest. Quite simply, every aspect of every type of legal practice involves numerous decisions; from the moment attorneys receive their first client,
they need to know who makes what decisions. Moreover, the question "who
decides" raises fundamental philosophical questions concerning the proper role
of a professional in society and the appropriate use of expertise. Finally, and
most significantly, the issue of decisionmaking authority tests the legal community's commitment to the principles of autonomy, and self-determination.
Should attorneys conduct themselves in a way that fosters or frustrates these
basic maxims of Anglo-American law?
This Essay challenges the current allocation of decisionmaking authority
between attorney and client and argues for an alternative allocation modeled on
an informed consent doctrine. Section I of this Essay describes the traditional
attorney-client relationship and sets forth the arguments typically used to justify
exclusive attorney decisionmaking. The Essay concludes in section II that the
current allocation of authority does not make sense, and that the asserted justifications for the current allocation are neither supportable nor desirable. Section
III then discusses informed consent as an alternative to the current model and
explores the principle of autonomy as the basis for shifting increased authority
to the client. Finally, section IV considers, and rejects, various arguments that
can be raised against an informed consent model for the legal profession.
7. See infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
8. Stone, Foreward to C. LIDz, A. MEISEL, E. ZERUBAVEL, M. CARTER, R. SESTAK & L.
ROTH, INFORMED CONSENT at ix-x (1984).
9. The first major article advocating informed consent for the legal profession appeared in
1979. See Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV.41 (1979).
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THE CURRENT ALLOCATION OF DECISIONMAKING AUTHORITY

The "Means-Ends" Paradigm

Many excellent articles have described in detail the current approach to
decisionmaking authority reflected in case law, practice, and the professional
codes. 10 This Essay does not intend to repeat such established grounds. Nonetheless, a brief description of the traditional "model" of decisionmaking is necessary to provide a framework for the remainder of this Essay.
The traditional allocation of decisionmaking authority is one in which the
client decides
the "ends" of the lawsuit while the attorney controls the
"means." ' 1 Thus, the client determines such "ends" as whether to settle a civil
suit 12 or to plead guilty in a criminal case,' 3 and the attorney decides, even
contrary to the client's express wishes, what legal and constitutional arguments
or defenses to raise.' 4 Although the right to waive a jury trial is the defendant's, 5 the attorney retains control over which jurors to select or strike. 16 The
right to appeal rests with the client, 17 however, the attorney alone may decide
10. See Martyn, Informed Consent in the PracticeofLaw, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv.307 (1980);
Maute, Allocation ofDecisionmakingAuthority Under the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 17
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1049 (1984); Spiegel, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct: LawyerClientDecisionmakingand the Role ofRules in Structuringthe Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 1003 [hereinafter Spiegel, New Model Rules]; Spiegel, supra note 9; see also Anderson, Informed Decisionmaking in an Office Practice, 28 B.C.L. REv. (Issue 2 1987) (advocating
informed consent in an estate practice context).
11. Spiegel, New Model Rules, supra note 10, at 1003-04.
12. See Whittier Union High School Dist. v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. App. 3d 504, 508, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 86, 89 (1977) (attorney has no authority to bind client to settlement); see also D. ROSENTHAL,
LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 157 (1974); cf.MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1980) (decision whether to accept a settlement offer should be the client's).
13. See generally I STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
§ 4-5.2(a)(i) (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter STANDARDS] (decision whether to plead guilty rests with the
accused); Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining,84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1306-07
(1975) (although client must decide whether to plead guilty, this is adhered to only in technical
sense; many attorneys feel their advice as to plea should prevail and that client is free to seek new
attorney if dissatisfied with attorney's choice of plea).
14. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (decision
to assert constitutional rights is necessarily entrusted to the attorney); Moreno v. Estelle, 717 F.2d
171, 177 (5th Cir. 1983) (attorney must make professional judgment as to plausibility of a defense),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 975 (1984); Ennis v. Lefeure, 560 F.2d 1072, 1075 (2d Cir. 1977) (attorney's
decision can bind client even though constitutional rights may be lost), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 976
(1978); Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1973) (counsel can waive right to object to
racial composition of grand jury without client's consent; attorney's duty does not include informing
defendant of every possible constitutional claim).
15. See Blanton v. Womancare Inc., 38 Cal. 3d 396, 407, 696 P.2d 645, 653, 212 Cal. Rptr. 151,
158 (1985) (en banc) (attorney has no authority to enter into binding arbitration agreement against
client's consent); Graves v. P.J. Taggares Co., 94 Wash. 2d 298, 305, 616 P.2d 1223, 1228 (1980) (en
banc) (client must consent to the withdrawal of a jury demand); STANDARDS, supra note 13, § 45.2(a) (decision to waive jury is for accused to make).
16. See STANDARDS, supra note 13, § 4-5.2(b) (decision regarding which jurors to strike is exclusive province of attorney after consultation with client); Chused, Faretta and the PersonalDefense: The Role of a Represented Defendant in Trial Tactics, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 636, 652 (1977)
(even relatively innocuous requests by the defendant to aid in selecting jury have been routinely
denied).
17. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (the defendant has authority to decide certain
fundamental issues, such as whether to appeal, but defense counsel is not required to raise on appeal
every nonfrivolous issue the defendant requests); Doyle v. United States, 721 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th
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what issues to raise on appeal. 18 Similarly, such trial tactics as whether to call a
witness (except a criminal defendant), whether and how to cross-examine a witness, and whether to object to evidence or testimony at trial, are all "means"
decisions resting with the attorney.1 9
Numerous courts have held that exclusive attorney decisionmaking over the
"means" of the lawsuit is appropriate. 20 For example, in Jones v. Estelle21 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently noted:
Criminal defendants daily entrust their liberty to the skill of their lawyers. The consequences of the lawyer's decisions fall squarely upon the
defendant. There is nothing untoward in this circumstance ....
Whether to call a particular witness, object to evidence, offer additional evidence or rest, or indeed advance a particular defense at all
often has immediate and grave impact upon the liberty or even the life
of a defendant. So long as the lawyer was competent, the representative character of the relationship between a lawyer and his client will
tolerate no other result [than the attorney's deciding such questions].
In this sense we have consistently held defendants to the decision of
22
their lawyers.
Similarly, in Gustave v. United States23 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit upheld an attorney's decisions not to move to suppress evidence of a line-up, not to subpoena certain witnesses, and not to question potential jurors about racial bias: "[Such decisions rest] upon the sound professional
judgment of the trial lawyer.., and the failure to [act] even against his client's
'24
wishes, is not ineffective representation."
In practice, attorneys are governed not only by case law defining acceptable
conduct, but also by the codes of ethics promulgated by bar associations. The
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, 25 however, "is at best ambiguous in
resolving this question of allocation of authority."' 26 A non-binding "ethical
Cir. 1983) (defense counsel's failure to prosecute defendant's appeal constituted ineffective assistance
of counsel even when no prejudice to defendant resulted).
18. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 750-54.
19. See, e.g., Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 1983) (matters of trial strategy are for counsel to decide); United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir.) (per curiam)
(decision to subpoena witnesses and nature of closing argument are strategic decisions for counsel to
make), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1127 (1981); Peterson v. Kennedy, 532 F. Supp. 113, 116 (N.D.N.Y.
1982) (decision whether to introduce forensic evidence is strategic choice for attorney); State v.
Marquez, 127 Ariz. 98, 103, 618 P.2d 592, 598 (1980) (counsel decides matters of trial strategy);
State v. Rodriguez, 126 Ariz. 28, 34-35, 612 P.2d 484, 490-91 (1980) (en banc) (decision whether to
call witnesses is strategic decision for counsel).
20. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
21. 722 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 976 (1984).
22. Id. at 165.
23. 627 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1980).
24. Id. at 904, 906.
25. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1970).

The Model Rules of Profes-

sional Conduct, although ostensibly favoring client control, also are ambiguous, and do not resolve

the question of decisionmaking authority. See Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked

About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 253-54 (1985); Spiegel, New
Model Rules, supra note 10, at 1005. As of July 1986, only 15 states had adopted versions of the
Model Rules. LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 249 (ABA-BNA July 23, 1986).

26. Spiegel, New Model Rules, supra note 10, at 1004; see Spiegel, supra note 9, at 65-73.
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consideration" speaks broadly, and vaguely, about the client deciding issues "affecting the merits of the cause."'27 Disciplinary Rule 7-101(b)(1), the only disciplinary rule on the topic of decisionmaking, similarly provides little guidance on
the issue: "[w]here permissible, [an attorney may] exercise his professional judgment to waive or fail to assert a right or position of his client."' 28 What is "permissible," however, is nowhere defined. Not surprisingly, the Annotated Code
'29
of Professional Responsibility describes this provision as "troublesome."
Given the vagueness of the code, attorneys may conform their behavior,
free from professional discipline, to the "means-ends" distinction. There is little
doubt that they do just that. Few trial or appellate attorneys explain legal strategies and possible alternatives to their clients.3 0 The "conventional wisdom"
among attorneys and jurists clearly supports the view that the attorney should
decide the means of the lawsuit. For example, Judge Clemant Haynsworth remarked: "[A] lawyer must never forget that he is the master. He is not there to
The lawyer must serve clients' legal needs as the
do the client's bidding ....
lawyer sees them not as the client sees them."13 1 F. Lee Bailey was no less direct
in his book, Fundamentalsof CriminalAdvocacy: "As to your position as his
attorney, make it clear [to the defendant] that you alone will control the strategy
of the defense, decide what legal points are to be raised, determine what witnesses to call, engage in whatever discussions you deem necessary with the
'32
prosecution."
Certainly many attorneys consult with their clients when making decisions.
However, no obligation requires that an attorney do so, nor is there a requirement that "full" disclosure of risks or alternatives be made. 33 In the final analysis, the decision is for the attorney to make, and neither courts nor bar
associations interfere with the attorney's prerogative.
Is this model of decisionmaking, which encourages attorney control over
many fundamental aspects of the lawsuit, desirable? To answer that question, it
is necessary first to consider the justifications offered for this model.
27. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1980).

28. Id. DR 7-101(b)(1).
29. ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 299 (1979); see also Maute, supra

note 10, at 1056 (noting that Disciplinary Rule 7-101 is "cryptic at best").
30. Stone, supra note 8, at x.
31. Haynsworth, Professionalism in Lawyering, 27 S.C.L. REV. 627, 628 (1976); see Mazor,
Power and Responsibility in the Attorney-Client Relation, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1120 (1968).
32. F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATT, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL ADVOCACY 44 (1974). Interestingly, Bailey later was sued by his celebrated client, Patty Hearst, on the ground that Hearst
was denied effective assistance of counsel because "she was not privy to certain aspects of the trial
and pretrial decision-making process" and that numerous decisions, such as venue, were made with-

out her consent. United States v. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. 1068, 1087 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Perhaps taking
note of the advice in Bailey's book, the court denied the claim of ineffective assistance, stating that
the power to control strategic decisions rests with the attorney. Id. at 1088.
33. See Spiegel, supra note 9, at 67-72. Essentially, the only obligation imposed by case law is
that the attorney inform his or her client on those issues the client must resolve. Id. at 68; see also
supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text (discussing allocation of decisionmaking under codes of
ethics promulgated by bar associations).
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B. Justificationsfor Attorney Decisionmaking
The allocation of decisionmaking authority to the attorney for the "means"
of a lawsuit is rooted in notions of paternalism, professional autonomy, and
efficiency.
1. Paternalism (Parentalism)

34

The main justification offered for attorney decisionmaking is based on
parentalistic assumptions. Parentalism is roughly defined as "interference with
a person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced."'35
Thus, the attorney, as parentalist, "claims to act on the (client's) behalf, but not
at that person's behest; indeed, the 'beneficiary' of paternalist action may even
explicitly repudiate those actions on his behalf."' 36 Parentalism in the legal profession is based on a belief that nonattorneys are inherently incapable of making
informed judgments, and thus need a professional to decide what legal alternatives are best for them. The attorney may even override the client's wishes for
what the attorney believes is in the client's benefit.
The parentalistic justification for attorney decisionmaking is often embraced explicitly by courts. For example, in Nelson v. State37 the attorney made
a strategic decision, against his client's wishes, to forego a challenge to evidence
based on the fourth amendment. Defendant was subsequently convicted. On
appeal defendant raised as error the fact his attorney acted against defendant's
instruction. The court rejected the argument that the attorney was bound to
follow the client's desires:
[O]nly counsel is competent to make such a decision ....
[C]ounsel
must be the manager of the law-suit ... [I]f such decisions are to be
made by the defendant he is likely to do himself more harm than good
.... One of the surest ways for counsel to lose a lawsuit is to permit
38
his client to run the trial.
Similarly, the Alaska Supreme Court has noted:
[T]he attorney acts on behalf of his client, and his actions are calculated to achieve the result which his client seeks. The attorney, moreover, is the expert-not the client. Short of outright incompetence, the
attorney's actions must be considered as being in the best interests of
39
his client.
Likewise, the United States Supreme Court in Jones v. Barnes4° implicitly
34. The term paternalism is sex-linked; it is drawn from the role of the father in the family.
Parentalism reflects, in a more egalitarian fashion, the same principles.
35. Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 108 (R. Wasserstrom ed. 1971).
36. See J. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE? PATERNALISM IN HEALTH CARE 4 (1982).

37. 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 964 (1965).
38. Id. at 81.
39. Lanier v. State, 486 P.2d 981, 986 (Alaska 1971); accord State v. Rodriguez, 126 Ariz. 28,
33-34, 612 P.2d 484, 489-90 (1980) (power to control trial strategy belongs to counsel because counsel's expertise is directed to achieve results in client's best interests).
40. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
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relied on the "superior skills" of the attorney to justify attorney decisionmaking.
In that case defendant had asked his attorney to raise several arguments on appeal. The attorney refused, and instead raised different arguments in his appel-

late brief. The Court held that it was not ineffective assistance of counsel for the
attorney to reject even colorable claims suggested by the client. 4 1 Writing for
the court, Justice Burger noted the importance of winnowing out weak argu-

ments on appeal and focusing on a few key issues and he assumed that an attorney's expertise is necessary to achieve this objective. 42 Accordingly, the choice

of argument on appeal is a strategic decision for the attorney alone to make.
2. Professional Autonomy
Besides parentalism, a second justification for attorney control over the
means or tactics of the lawsuit can be termed loosely "professional autonomy."
Simply stated, attorneys have an interest in their craft and reputation that may

require them to act contrary to their clients' instructions. For example, the client may request that the attorney raise numerous arguments, including ones the
lawyer believes to be weak (but not frivolous). Being compelled to articulate

weak positions at a minimum jeopardizes an attorney's reputation. More importantly, it forces the attorney to act contrary to his or her best professional judgment. Attorneys are trained and expected to exercise such judgment; to follow
every whim of their clients would make them little more than "mouthpieces." 43
A related concern is that the client would force the attorney to abrogate the
duties owed to the court and to society. In other words, the fear is that counsel
would be compelled to act "unethically"--to engage ;n "dubious" tactics-at

the client's request. 44 More subtly, attorneys may act unethically not merely
due to client pressure, but because they no longer feel responsibility for the deci-

sions being made. This argument suggests that once stripped of the power of

choice, attorneys will become like soldiers, compelled to adhere to the orders of
41. Id. at 754.
42. Id. at 752-54; see also Stricklan v. Koella, 546 S.W.2d 810, 813 (renn. Ct. App. 1976)
(clients do not know "when to stop"; to them, brevity indicates incompetence) (quoting English case
of Rondel v. Worsley, (1966) 1 All E.R. 467,480, aff'd, (1967) 1 Q.B. 443, aff'd, (1969) 1 A.C. 191).
43. Former Chief Justice Burger graphically stated this concern, using a medical analogy:
Very quickly we come to the question [of] ... who controls the case.... These distinguished criminal defense lawyers were very firm in the proposition that the lawyer must
control the case-the lawyer as a professional must control the case. I remember one of
these lawyers using as an analogy, that any other standard would be as ridiculous as having
a man go into the hospital, to have his appendix taken out by local anesthetic, telling the
doctor, "No, don't cut there, cut here. Don't clamp that vein, clamp this one."
Burger, Counselfor the Prosecution and Defense-Their Roles Under the Minimum Standards, 8
AM. CRIM. L.Q. 2, 4-5 (1969).
Some courts apparently are concerned with the attorney's freedom to exercise his or her craft.
See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 346 F.2d 73, 81 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 964 (1965) (No competent
attorney would accept the case if he or she had to defer to the wishes of the client.); see also Mazor,
supra note 31, at 1134 (Many cases "show greater solicitude for the plight of the lawyer than for the
predicament of the client. The lawyer's freedom to exercise his craftmanship is emphasized, not the
defendant's freedom to make choices in matters affecting his fate.").
44. Judge Haynsworth has expressed concern about this possibility: "[the lawyer] owes a duty
of loyalty to his client, but he has a higher duty as an officer of the court." Haynsworth, supra note
31, at 628.
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another. The attorney's reaction may be a form of the "ours is not to question
why" mentality. 45
3.

Efficiency

Finally, attorney control over the "means" of a lawsuit is justified by a
myriad of efficiency concerns. Most typically, proponents of this argument raise
the spectre of a never-ending trial punctuated by frequent interruptions and objections by the client and lengthened by constant recesses for attorney-client
conferences. 46 The notion of requiring client consent to every objection raised
and every question asked of a witness quickly would go from cumbersome to
inconceivable.
These external costs to the system, it is argued, mitigate against client participation. As the Alaska Supreme Court noted:
It might be feared that a rule requiring an attorney to consult with his
client.., would unduly interfere with trials. Not only would it hamper the attorney, it might force the trial judge to interrupt the proceedings whenever a waiver might be occurring in order to protect the
record on appeal .... If carried far enough, it could... slow a trial to
a snail's pace .... 47
Also, there is a fear that even out of the courtroom the time necessary to explain
45. Numerous psychological studies were undertaken, particularly after the Nazi era, to determine why seemingly rational individuals pursue irrational or antisocial ends under the guise of submitting to authority. Perhaps the most famous study was that conducted by Stanley Milgram.
Milgram's experimental program at Yale University investigated the triad of authority, executant,
and victim to determine under what conditions submission to authority is most probable. Milgram,
Some Conditions Of Obedience and Disobediance to Authority, 18 HUM. REL. 57 (1965). Almost
1000 male adults between 20 to 50 years old, with a balanced occupational composition of skilled
and unskilled workers, professionals and businesspersons, were told that it was their task as subjects
to administer punishment to a "learner," to help determine the effects of punishment on memory.
The "learner," or victim (actually a lab assistant) was asked questions, and the subject was instructed to give increasingly intense electric shocks to the learner for wrong answers. As the intensity of the shocks increased, the victim demanded that the experiment stop. Id. at 59. However, the
experimenter would order the subjects to continue the shocks and disregard the victim's increasingly
insistent protests. Id. at 60. Although subjects often expressed deep disapproval of shocking a person in the face of objections, many nonetheless complied. Id. at 72-73. Milgram explained that this
disregard for others demonstrates the extent to which obedient dispositions were ingrained in some
of the subjects. Id. at 73. The disturbing results indicated that "a substantial proportion of people
do what they are told to do irrespective of the content of the act and without limitations of conscience, so long as they percieve that the command comes from a legitimate authority." Id. at 75.
46. Former Chief Justice Burger, concurring in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977),
noted:
Not only do ... decisions [such as deciding if and when to object, which witnesses to call,
and what defenses to develop] rest with the attorney, but such decisions must, as a practical matter, be made without consulting the client. The trial process simply does not permit
the type of frequent and protracted interruptions which would be necessary if it were required that clients give knowing and intelligent approval to each of the myriad tactical
decisions as a trial proceeds.
Id. at 93 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See generally Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession,
1981 Wis. L. REv. 454, 454-59 & n.9 (lawyer may be required to use tactics that client objects to in
order to further client's best interests).
47. Lanier v. State, 486 P.2d 981, 987 (Alaska 1971); accord United States v. Zylstra, 713 F.2d
1332, 1339 (7th Cir.) ("To allow the defendant to repeatedly interfere with the trial strategy of his
counsel would disrupt the proper functioning of the trial court during trial and create havoc."), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 965 (1983); Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 38 Cal. 3d 396, 404, 696 P.2d 645, 650,
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the legal proceedings to obtain client consent would be prohibitively costly for
both attorney and client.
II.

THE LIMITS OF THE CURRENT ALLOCATION
OF DECISIONMAKING AUTHORITY

The allocation of decisionmaking authority in which "means" decisions rest
with the attorney and the client decides only the ends of the lawsuit can be
challenged along two lines. First, this Essay argues that the distinction between
means and ends makes little sense because no principle distinguishes means decisions from end decisions. And even assuming it is possible to define the difference between means and ends, there is no persuasive justification for letting the
client decide one but not the other.
A description of the weaknesses in the means-ends distinction does not, by
itself, invalidate the concept of attorney decisionmaking. It simply illustrates
that the current division of authority is suspect. It does not determine whether
there should be more, or less, attorney decisionmaking or where to redraw the
boundaries. Thus, this Essay's second argument attempts to challenge on normative grounds the allocation of decisionmaking authority to the attorney. The
Essay contends that the three justifications for attorneys making even "means"
decisions-parentalism, lawyer autonomy, and efficiency-are unproven and unpersuasive. Section III of this Essay then examines an alternative value in favor
of client decisionmaking: autonomy.
A.

The Means-Ends Distinction: A False Dichotomy

The current allocation of decisionmaking authority assumes that it is possible to draw a workable distinction between means and ends. Absent a clear
distinction, it is difficult to understand why the client gets "ends" decisions but
not "means," and it is impossible to predict which decisions belong to the client
and which to counsel.
The means-ends distinction rests on the assumption that there exists certain
determinable decisions that can be classified as means or ends. Means are
merely strategic decisions that are separate and independent from the ends, or
the objectives, of the lawsuit. This assumed dichotomy between means and ends
does not survive close analysis. In many cases what the attorney assumes to be
mere means really are part of the client's ultimate objectives. Thus, "the client
may want to win acquittal by asserting a certain right, because it vindicates him
in a way that matters to him, or he may wish to obtain a settlement without
using a certain tactic because he disapproves of the tactic."' 48 In other words,
that which is often thought to be an end might really be a means; that which is
assumed to be just a means could be an end to a particular client. For instance,
"winning" is assumed to be an end of any lawsuit. As a result, criminal defend212 Cal. Rptr. 151, 147 (1985) ("Considerations of procedural efficiency require ...
course of a trial there be but one captain per ship.").
48. Luban, supra note 46, at 459 n.9.

that in the
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ants are allowed to decide whether to plead guilty. But why assume that winning acquittal is the end? It could be that receiving the lightest possible sentence
is the true end of many criminal defendants. From that perspective, pleading
guilty is a means-a strategic decision-to the end of sentence reduction.
Perhaps this problem in the means-ends distinction can best be illustrated
by a medical analogy. A woman diagnosed as having breast cancer obviously
desires to be cured. That is the end result she wants. However, it would be
difficult to accept that the only decision to be made by the woman is to choose
life and that the means of a cure should be left to the discretion of others. The
assumption that the woman has no legitimate interest in the type of treatment
she receives-that the treatment is merely a tactical decision that can be viewed
separately and independently from the end-would be repugnant to most of us.
Professor David Luban provides numerous hypothetical examples from law
in which mere "tactical" decisions matter as much, if not more, to the client
than the end result.49 In one hypothetical, which Luban calls the "Long Black
Veil case," 50 an innocent client, accused of murder, forbids his attorney from
calling an alibi witness, even if it means losing the case. At the time of the
murder defendant was in the arms of his best friend's wife, and his personal
honor requires that this incident be kept secret. Despite the fact the client
clearly views protecting his lover as an "end" of the lawsuit, his attorney, under
the current allocation of authority, may override the client and call the witness-in the client's own best interest. Such a decision is viewed as a means
decision within the sole power of the attorney.
There are, of course, many less dramatic examples of means decisions that
are difficult to distinguish from the ends. A client may not want his or her
attorney to argue an insanity defense; the client's "pride" may be more important than succeeding on this argument. Or a client may not want any more
continuances in a civil case because stress from the uncertainty outweighs the
possible benefits of delay. Or a client may want a certain argument raised because it might establish a long sought after legal principle, even though the
chance of success is low.
In sum, the line between means and ends is imprecise at best. At a minimum, clients have a legitimate, and at times, overriding interest in what many
characterize as the "means" of the lawsuit.
Although never expressly articulated, the argument that ends decisions implicate fundamental constitutional rights and means decisions do not perhaps
underlies the position of those favoring the traditional allocation of attorneyclient decisionmaking. However, this distinction does not explain the difference
49. Luban, supra note 46, at 456.
50. Luban, supra note 46, at 456. This hypothetical is derived from a song written by M.J.
Wilkin & D. Dill. The song goes, in part:
The judge said "Son, what is your alibi?
If you were somewhere else then you won't have to die."
I spoke not a word, though it meant my life
For I had been in the arms of my best friend's wife.
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adequately. For example, the right to have a jury free from racial prejudice is a
fundamental right; 5' nonetheless, clients do not have the right to force their
attorneys to question jurors with respect to their racial prejudices. 52 A person
has a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, but
clients cannot force their attorneys to challenge the admission of evidence on
fourth amendment grounds.5 3 Settlement of a civil suit is an ends decision belonging to the client; however, it involves no constitutional rights.
Finally, in many ways the current allocation of decisionmaking authority is
paradoxical. On the one hand, ends decisions are so important, so fundamental,
that only the client can decide them. On the other hand, means decisions,
although merely tactical, belong to the expert because, among other reasons,
attorneys make more learned decisions. Thus, the current allocation of decisionclient-the poorer decisionmaker-the most
making authority reserves to 5the
4
critical choices in the lawsuit.
Not only is the distinction between "means" and "ends" unworkable, but
also the justifications for attorneys' deciding even the "means" of the lawsuit do
not withstand scrutiny. Those justifications-parentalism, professional autonomy, and efficiency-are considered in the following sections.
B. Parentalism
Parentalistic intervention typically occurs in one of two situations. First,
intervention may occur when an individual is incapable of rational decisionmaking because of some defect or limit in capability due to ignorance, youth, or
mental incapacity. 55 Intervention on grounds of ignorance or incapacity is what
James Childress terms "weak paternalism" because it ostensibly does not interfere with a person's voluntary choice. 56 John Stuart Mill provided an example
of such parentalistic action:
If either a public officer or anyone else saw a person attempting to
cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were
no time to warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him
back, without any real infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists
in doing
what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the
57
river.

51. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 & n.6 (1976) (criminal defendant has constitutional
right under sixth and fourteenth amendments to impartial jury).
52. See Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 1980) (although defendant must
have opportunity to ask about bias, whether defense will avail itself of such opportunity will in most
instances involve exercise of judgment that should be left to counsel).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Aulet, 618 F.2d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 1980) (decision to move to
supress evidence discovered in body search of client strategic decision for attorney); Nelson v. State,
346 F.2d 73, 80 (9th Cir.) (attorney may decide, contrary to client's wishes, to forego a challenge to
evidence even when there exists a possible challenge to evidence based on fourth amendment), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 964 (1965).
54. See Chused, supra note 16, at 668-72.
55. J. CHILDRESS, supra note 36, at 102.
56. J. CHILDRESS, supra note 36 at 17, 102.
57. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 95 (1978).
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The second type of parentalistic intervention occurs when a person's riskbenefit analysis is unreasonable according to the intervenor's standards. Intervention because a person's decision is believed to be wrong is what Childress
calls "strong paternalism." Under this theory parentalism is justified even when
the individual is an adult, is otherwise rational, and possesses full information,
58
because the decision is considered unreasonable.
Parentalism in legal decisionmaking can occur in either situation. Consider, for example, the decision whether to call an alibi witness. The client
wants the attorney to call the witness; the attorney refuses. The attorney, knowing the rules of evidence, realizes that the alibi witness' prior criminal record can
be introduced; a result the attorney believes would be extremely damaging to the
client. Furthermore, the attorney, knowing from experience something about
the psychology of juries, believes that the alibi witness will reflect poorly on the
client. The attorney's refusal to call the witness on the grounds of the client's
ignorance of the rules of evidence and courtroom dynamics would be an example of weak parentalism. The attorney believes that he or she is implementing
the decision the client would choose were the client knowledgeable about legal
strategy.
Assume now that the attorney explained to the client the reasons for refusing to call the witness. The client still vehemently wants the alibi witness to
testify. The attorney's refusal to call the witness, believing the client's assessment of risks and benefits to be irrational, is an example of strong parentalism.
In this case the attorney also feels he or she is acting benevolently; the decision
implements what the attorney believes is in the client's best interests.
In one sense, weak parentalism is less troubling than strong parentalism
because the attorney ostensibly implements what the client wants. However,
this form of parentalism really raises more questions than it answers. How do
we know what the client wants? More fundamentally, should we require that an
attorney first try to educate the individual to relieve the state of ignorance?5 9
Mill's example is the quintessentially easy case: an emergency situation, life
"hanging in the balance," and presumably no time to explain the danger. In the
courtroom it may, by analogy, justify parentalism in those few circumstances
when discussion is truly infeasible. 60 In other words, efficiency may, in limited
circumstances, explain why parentalistic action rather than information should
be forthcoming. But what about the vast majority of situations in which time is
not of the essence? There must be an assumption of inherent incapability; that
is, that explanations would be pointless because the client can never understand
the factors sufficiently to make an informed choice. This Essay discusses this
issue in detail shortly. For now, it merely should be noted that this basic precept
has never been proven empirically. There is no evidence that legal decisions rest
58. J. CHILDRESS, supra note 36, at 17, 102.
59. See J. CHILDRESS, supra note 36, at 105-06 ("[L]ack of understanding cannot be used as an
excuse for paternalistic interention unless efforts have been made-time permitting-to increase the
patient's understanding by disclosure of information.").
60. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
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on factors so complex that clients cannot understand them after receiving an
attorney's explanation. To the contrary, studies have demonstrated the ability
of people to understand
technical information when such information is
61
presented appropriately.
In the final analysis, both weak and strong parentalism assume that attorneys will make decisions in the best interest of their clients and that these decisions will be "better" than those their clients could make. In essence, the
justification for parentalistic intervention rests on three explicit assumptions:
(1)The lawyer understands the needs and interests of the client;
(2) The lawyer will act to satisfy those needs; and
(3) The lawyer is uniquely equipped by education and experience to make
the decision in the best interests of the client. Because the client does not possess
the professional's esoteric knowledge, the client cannot choose the best course of
action.
Assumptions (1) and (2) are necessary, but not sufficient to justify parentalism. For example, merely knowing the client's needs is irrelevant if the attorney's personal motivations prevent the attorney from attempting to meet those
needs. In such a case the attorney is not acting truly in the best interests of the
client, a cardinal precept of parentalism. On the other hand, an attorney motivated to meet the needs of a client must also be capable of understanding what
those needs are and how best to meet them.
Assumption (3), which is both necessary and sufficient to justify at least the
strong parentalistic approach, cannot be true unless (1) and (2) are true.
Parentalism, after all, attempts to be benevolent; it tries to recognize and respond to the individual's needs. In addition, assumption (3), like strong
parentalism generally, assumes that there is such a thing as the most rational or
"best decision." This Essay contends that none of these three justifications for
parentalism are valid.
First, can the attorney truly recognize the client's needs and interests?
There is significant reason to question the attorney's ability to identify the client's concerns accurately. 62 Even with the purest of motives, attorneys often
ascribe certain standard, imputed ends to their clients, rather than acknowledge
the actual ends and desires of clients. For example, many persons consider
pleading the statute of limitations as unfair; nonetheless, attorneys routinely will
plead it, responding to a particular theory of human nature. 63 Similarly, the
maxim of legal strategy, that any "lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in
no uncertain terms to make no statement to the police under any circum61. See infra notes 124-129 and accompanying text.
62. See W. GAYLIN, I. GLASSER, S. MARCUS & D. ROTHMAN, DOING GOOD: THE LIMrrs OF

BENEVOLENCE 93-95 (1978); infra text accompanying notes 63-69.
63. See Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978
Wis. L. REV. 29, 56-57; see also Lehman, The Pursuit ofa Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078
(1979) (discussing conflict between what attorneys assume to be clients' needs and actual needs of
clients); Luban, supra note 46, at 459 n.9 (client may want to vindicate a certain right without using
a certain tactic because he or she disapproves of it; client's ends may be mistaken as only means by
the attorney).
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stances," imputes to all criminal defendants the same end: escaping punishment. Although such an end may be widespread, it ignores the possibility that
for some defendants, confession may be cathartic and prolonging the ordeal may
be more terrible than the punishment. 64
The attorney's inability to recognize the client's interests accurately is particularly acute when the client is a criminal defendant. Attorneys and clients in
criminal cases often are separated by vast differences in social, economic, or
racial status. 65 In these circumstances it is difficult for the attorney to understand fully the underlying wishes and goals of the client. Communication,
which might help minimize certain cultural differences, is typically not
forthcoming.
Even assuming attorneys adequately recognize their clients' interests and
concerns, attorneys still may not act in their clients' best interests. Theoretically, the duty of loyalty owed by the attorney to the client ensures that the
attorney reaches a decision considering only the needs of the client. In reality,
however, attorneys' self-interests influence the choices they make for their clients. 66 These interests often conflict with those of the client. As Professor Mark
Spiegel describes:
the decision not to seek out a witness may involve a trade-off between
the lawyer's use of time and the client's desire for that witnesses' testimony. The choice of the forum may involve a trade-off between the
lawyer's convenience and the client. The lawyer's decision to present a
novel legal argument or his decision not to offer a foolish one also may
67
involve a tradeoff between the lawyer's and client's needs.
Moreover, significant economic conflicts of interest arise between lawyer
and client, regardless of whether the attorney is paid an hourly rate or a contingent fee. An attorney charging a set hourly rate has no direct economic incentive to work the particular number of hours that results in the largest net
recovery to the client. The attorney's incentive is to work the maximum number
of hours even though a smaller number would be better for the client. As
Professors Clermont and Currivan explain:
No matter how many hours the lawyer devotes to the case before he
ceases work and shifts his efforts to other cases, his economic position
64. See Simon, supra note 63, at 57 n.65, 58.
65. See Burt, supra note 2, at 1035-36.
66. See D. ROSENTHAI, supranote 12, at 106. Similar concerns influenced the development of
informed consent in the medical profession. As Professor Katz explains:
To be sure, physicians and patients are united in the common pursuit of restoring patients
to "healthy" life. Since that objective rarely can be fully achieved, however, it remains an
ambiguous one.... In the absence of any one clear road to well being, identity of interest
cannot be assumed and consensus on goals, let alone on which paths to follow can only be
accomplished through conversation.
J. KATz, supra note 3, at xvii-xviii; accord Thompson, PsychologicalIssues in Informed Consent, in 3
MAKING HEALTH CARE DF:CISIONS, supra note 4, at 83, 114-15 (Doctors may have ulterior motives
that influence the choices they make for patients. Even if the doctor decides in good faith, the
decision may not be optimal from the patient's perspective, because the doctor's view of what is best
may differ from that of the patient.).
67. See Spiegel, supra note 9, at 88-89.
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will be unaffected, because he is being paid at his normal hourly rate
and the fee is unconditional. If his workload happens to be light, the
lawyer would tend to work more than the particular number of hours
required to maximize his client's net recovery-a strategy obviously to
his client's disadvantage. The overworked attorney would tend to
work fewer68 than that particular number of hours, also to the client's
detriment.
Likewise, in the case of a contingent fee the attorney optimizes his or her
economic position by working a small number of hours to obtain a respectable
settlement. In either case the "lawyer's economic interests do not align with
those of his client."' 69 The attorney's concern about his or her time, profit, and
other personal interests affect, perhaps subconsciously, the choices made for the
client. Thus, the parentalistic assumption-that lawyers act in the best interest
of their clients-is at least suspect.
Finally, the assumption that lawyers are better decisionmakers with respect
to the means of litigation is unsupportable. Proponents of parentalism argue
that attorneys' technical knowledge equips them to make "better decisions" that
maximize their clients' goals. 70 The argument that attorneys make better decisions appears weak from the outset. As indicated earlier, attorneys often do not
'recognize their clients' actual needs and interests, and even if they do, they often
are subverted from acting in the best interests of their client by personal motivations. 7 1 More fundamentally, what is a better decision? And assuming that it is
clear what a "better decision" is, why believe that the attorney's professional
knowledge necessarily yields better results than client decisionmaking?
What is a "better decision" is not an easy question to answer. At a simple
level, a better decision is one more likely to result in the client winning the
lawsuit, or achieving his or her ultimate goal. For example, if the plaintiff's
lawyer decides not to call a witness because the testimony more likely than not
will hurt the plaintiff, that presumably is a better decision than calling the witness. But what if the plaintiff wants the witness called because he or she wants a
certain side of the story told? What if the prospective witness is the plaintiff,
who feels it critical to explain certain events to vindicate him or herself, or who
just cares most about having his or her story heard? Consider again the problem
associated with the means-ends distinction. Clients want to win, but they often
want to win a "certain way." Sometimes the way is more important than the
result.
Furthermore, questions about legal means usually do not have one "right"
answer. It is not simply a matter of applying the attorney's expertise. Rather,
such decisions involve questions of values and unquantifiable risks. For in68.
(1978);
69.
70.

Clermont & Currant, Improving on the Contingency Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 529, 535-36
see Maute, supra note 10, at 1074-75.
Clermont & Currant, supra note 68, at 536.
See supratext accompanying notes 34-42; see also C. LIDz, A. MEISEL, E. ZERUBAVEL, M.
CARTER, R. SESTAK & L. ROTH, INFORMED CONSENT 11 (1984) ("[D]ecisions about medical care
are not to be made exclusively by physicians, because only the patient has access to the personal
information, which is highly relevant to the making of the decision.") [hereinafter C. LIDz].
71. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
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stance, the attorney for the defendant in a personal injury suit believes that a
continuance probably will increase the willingness of the impoverished plaintiff
to settle and to do so for less money. Perhaps the lawyer even could roughly
quantify that increased chance at thirty percent. The "rational" decision would
be to cause a delay. However, delay is troubling to the defendant. Uncertain
liability and the stress of involvement in the legal system makes the defendant
loath to delay any longer. Perhaps too, the defendant finds the use of a tactical
tool to exploit the plaintiff's poverty offensive. Certainly, the attorney's technical knowledge does not aid him or her in weighing the benefits of delay against
the client's anxiety and ethical beliefs. Moreover, the attorney is inherently less
capable of evaluating those subjective factors than the client. They are valu.es
72
that can only be communicated imprecisely.
The limits of expert decisionmaking were primary factors in the argument
for informed consent in the medical context. 73 Consider, for example, the hypothetical woman with breast cancer. Clearly, the doctor possesses superior medical knowledge concerning treatment modalities. But that expertise does not
enable the doctor to determine whether the woman should choose radical surgery and the ten to twenty year survival rate, or less disfiguring treatment, with
a statistical proof of somewhat reduced life span. The decision depends less on
technical expertise and more on value judgments.
In the examples drawn from law as well as from medicine, the professional's technical knowledge is necessary but not sufficient to reach a "better
result." The assumption that attorneys make better decisions than clients because attorneys possess superior technical skills ignores that clients possess
unique information about their own value hierarchy. A decision devoid of such
value judgments can never be defined as the "best decision."
C. ProfessionalAutonomy
The justification for attorney decisionmaking based on professional autonomy encompasses three distinct arguments. First, attorney decisionmaking is
central to being an attorney, and client decisionmaking subverts what it means
to be an attorney. 74 Second, the attorney's professional reputation might be
jeopardized if he or she were forced to follow the client's every whim. 75 Last,
client decisionmaking would cause lawyers to violate the duties owed to third
parties and to society generally. 76 None of these arguments, however, justify the
current allocation of decisionmaking authority to the attorney.
The argument that "lawyering requires attorney decisionmaking" is tauto72. See J. KATz, supra note 3, at 92, 99, 102 (physicians cannot convey all aspects of esoteric
knowledge to patients; burden of justifying patient participation should reside with opponents).
73. See Shultz, From Informed Consent to PatientChoice: A New ProtectedInterest, 95 YALE
L.J. 219, 222 (1985) ("[Iln the face of value pluralism, factual indeterminancy and increasing options, patient autonomy has become a central principle of both popular and philosophical analysis of
medical decision making.").
74. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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logical: it is defined that way because attorneys arbitrarily define it that way.
There is nothing inherent to the practice of law that requires an attorney to
make decisions for the client. To the contrary, the fact the client must make
certain decisions demonstrates that client decisionmaking is not inconsistent
with lawyering.
To say that the attorney is transformed from a "thinking professional" into
a hired mouthpiece under an informed consent doctrine clearly is exaggeration.
Even under an informed consent model the attorney would perform the functions traditionally associated with "lawyering": researching the law, applying
the law to a particular fact situation, and attempting to persuade others that the
client's position is the correct one. The only difference under an informed consent model is that attorneys also would use their special skills and expertise to
inform their clients of the legal issue and to help clients reach a viable decision.
The doctor is no less a thinking professional because he or she is required to
obtain patient consent; nor would the attorney be less a thinking professional.
Admittedly, attorneys may have an interest in maintaining decisionmaking
authority to preserve their professional reputations. On a personal level, the
attorney may fear that he or she will not "look good" if compelled to raise an
argument that is weak-but not frivolous. Of course, some of this fear may be
minimized once informed consent becomes the norm, and the choice of strategy
is not automatically ascribed to the attorney. Moreover, the situations in which
the client will force the attorney to raise a truly weak argument should be few.
As this Essay argues later, the assumption that clients are poor decisionmakers
is incorrect. 77 In general, it should take little persuasion to get a client to under78
stand that a particular argument has little chance of success.
Moreover, the client's interests outweigh any concern the attorney has in
maintaining decisionmaking authority to preserve his or her reputation. It
should be remembered that it is the client's day in court, not the lawyer's. The
consequences of a trial obviously affect the client in a much more profound way
than they affect the lawyer. The client does the time in a criminal case, and it is
79
the client's money at stake in a civil suit.
The third argument-that client decisionmaking will force attorneys to vio77. See infra notes 124-129 and accompanying text.
78. As Justice Brennan has noted, "It should take little or no persuasion to get a wise client to
understand that, if staying out of prison is what he values most, he should encourage his lawyer to
raise only his two or three best arguments on appeal, and he should defer to his lawyer's advice as to
which are the best arguments." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 761 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel includes the right of defendants to waive the right to counsel knowingly and
proceed pro se. The court stated:
It is the accused, not counsel, who must be "informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation," who must be "confronted with the witnesses against him," and who must be
accorded "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." Although not stated
in the amendment in so many words, the right to self-representation-to make one's own
defense personally-is thus necessarily implied by the structure of the amendment. The
right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if
the defense fails.
Id. at 819-20 (quoting the language of the sixth amendment).
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late duties owed to others-misunderstands the model of informed consent. Essentially, this argument suggests that clients will ask their attorneys to act
unethically, and that attorneys will be forced to do so. Informed consent, however, only gives the client the right to make decisions; it does not mean that the
attorney must acquiesce. Bar associations, and the courts, should make clear
that attorneys cannot defend against a charge of unethical conduct on the
ground they acted at the client's behest. As a President's Commission considering the issue of informed consent in health care noted in its report: "Patient
choice is not absolute. Patients are not entitled to insist that health care practitioners furnish them services when to do so would violate either the bounds of
acceptable practice or a professional's own deeply held moral belief."'80 If the
client asks the attorney to act illegally or unethically the attorney should explain
to the client why he or she cannot do so. If the client remains insistent in the
demand the attorney, if practicable, should withdraw from the lawsuit.81 Perhaps also, attorneys will exercise more care under an informed consent doctrine
to accept only those cases and clients with which they ethically feel comfortable.
Moreover, informed consent actually may lead to less unethical behavior.
Attorneys who currently act ethically can continue to do so; nothing in the informed consent doctrine requires otherwise. Attorneys who now behave unethically, however, may be compelled to act in a more ethical manner by their
clients. It is conceivable that attorneys act unethically because they ascribe certain imputed ends to the client-they assume that the client wants them to behave in such a manner. 82 Under an informed consent model, the attorney must
deal with the client's actual desires; in such a case unethical conduct might decrease. At the very least, there is no reason to believe that unethical behavior
would increase because of client decisionmaking. As Professor Spiegel writes:
Lawyers, rather than confront differences with their clients, may impute selfish motives and ends to them. Under present practice, therefore, the lawyer might present possibly false testimony on the
unquestioned assumption that the client so desires. Informed consent
offers two possibilities for change: the lawyer may discover that his
assumption was wrong, or the client, after discussion
with the lawyer,
83
may decide against presenting the testimony.
80. 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 4, at 3. The attorney's duty of loyalty
would continue to be limited under an informed consent model, as it is under the traditional decisionmaking model, to "legitimate, lawful conduct compatible with the very nature of a trial as a
search for truth ...." Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 994 (1986). "[T]he legal profession has
accepted that an attorney's ethical duty to advance the interests of his client is limited by an equally
solemn duty to comply with the law and standards of professional conduct ...." Id. at 995.
81. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility currently permits the attorney to withdraw
from representation in certain limited circumstances, but places significant restrictions on the client.
See, eg., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110 (B), (C) (1970). A loosening
of these rules to "increase the moral choice of the lawyer as well as the client" may be advisable
under an informed consent model. See Martyn, supra note 10, at 317-18.
82. In an extreme example, G. Gordon Liddy suggested serving his client, Richard Nixon, by
such techniques as drugging the opposition, kidnapping, hiring professional killers, eavesdropping,
and spying. Burt, supra note 2, at 1023 n.36.

83. Spiegel, supra note 9, at 119.
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Efficiency

The argument that efficient functioning of the judicial system justifies attorney decisionmaking has some, albeit minimal, validity. Certainly, there are
times when it is impractical for the attorney to confer with the client and obtain
consent. One can imagine a courtroom scene resembling a Marx Brothers
movie-the attorney objects to a question and the client objects to that
objection.
However, the efficiency argument proves too much. On its face the argument pertains most readily to in-trial, courtroom scenarios requiring speedy, onthe-spot judgments. Essentially, this means that decisions such as whether to
object to testimony or evidence, and what spontaneous questions to ask should
rest with the attorney-although even here, the "tone" and approach of attack
can be discussed with the client in advance. For example, the client can request
that the attorney not ask a witness a certain line of questions, or that the attorney treat a "hostile" witness gently. In those unusual circumstances in which
the attorney's approach is contrary to the guidelines provided by the client, the
client could request and the court could grant a continuance.
The attorney's right to make certain in-trial decisions could constitute an
exception analogous to the emergency or incompetence exceptions in the medical informed consent model. Doctors are permitted to treat a patient without
consent when obtaining consent is impossible and immediate treatment is necessary. 84 Just as there is no realistic opportunity for consultation in such medical
emergencies, informed consent is not always feasible in certain trial settings.
This fact, however, does not justify attorney resolution of all means decisions.
At best, this efficiency argument means that in situations in which an instantaneous decision must be made and prior consultation with the client is not feasible
attorney decisionmaking is the only viable option.
The concern for the efficient functioning of trials obviously has no relevance
for the vast majority of legal issues, which are resolved out of court. Moreover,
it has no applicability to appellate argument. There is more than ample time for
counsel to confer with the client over the choice of argument on appeal.8 5
A second "efficiency" concern asserted in support of attorney decisionmaking is that the time and cost of providing the information to the client is prohibitive. If this means that attorneys may not make quite as much money, so be it.
The client's needs should take precedence over the attorney's need for more
income. As Jay Katz noted with respect to the analogous complaint from
doctors:
The railroading of patients, seeing scores of them a day back to back,
84. See F. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 88-92 (1984).

85. Appellate advocacy illustrates well the scope of the efficiency argument. Both the arguments made in the written brief and during the oral presentation should be subject to the client's
consent. On the other hand, the attorney need not get the client's consent to respond to the judge's
questions; however, the answer should be consistent with the client's approach. See Krisher, Jones
v. Barnes, The Sixth and the Fourteenth Amendments: Whose Appeal is it, Anyway?, 47 OHIO ST.
L.J. 179, 195 (1986) (advocating client decisionmaking with respect to the arguments raised on
appeal).
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surely would be affected by conversation. If physicians were to suffer
as a consequence, then doctors' contemporary claims to a right to financial compensation, that has placed them near the top in earnings
compared with other groups, must be reconciled
with medicine's an86
cient claim to placing patient care first.
Even assuming that the income of attorneys is a legitimate concern, attorneys' salaries will not suffer significantly. First, those that bill hourly can recoup
any additional cost by charging for the time. Second, conversation time will not
necessarily be lengthy, especially when attorneys become accustomed to explaining issues to clients. 87 Moreover, it is possible that attorneys currently spend at
least some time justi~ting certain decisions, after the fact, to irate clients.
Ironically, an informed consent model ultimately may increase attorneys'
salaries by encouraging more people to seek legal assistance. Some individuals
may be deterred from seeking legal advice by the fear that they will have no
control over the lawsuit. A practice of law that permits and encourages active
client participation may entice many who need legal advice to seek it.
On the other hand, the fear that increased costs, passed on to the client, will
render legal advice unaffordable to many is a legitimate concern. Significant
numbers of individuals already are deterred from seeking legal advice because of
perceived or actual inability to afford the cost.88 The concern is that imposing
an informed consent requirement will worsen this situation. It is impossible to
predict empirically how much informed consent will "cost" each client in additional fees, and whether that incremental amount will render legal assistance
unaffordable. It is doubtful, however, that the costs of consultation will be a
significant proportion of the legal bill. As indicated earlier, obtaining consent on
most issues would not be a lengthy process. Given the high cost of legal fees, the
additional expenses caused by communication should be marginal. It is unlikely, moreover, that individuals will perceive informed consent as being the
"final straw," pushing the cost of legal assistance beyond reach.
The real question is whether those who want and can afford to make decisions should be prevented from doing so because others cannot or do not want to
pay for it. The appropriate solution is not to keep all clients from exercising
decisionmaking authority, but to subsidize increased legal services for the poor
to ensure the availability of legal assistance. Admittedly, absent such a solution,
some individuals will desire to waive the right to make certain decisions because
of cost. Still, many middle or lower income people undoubtedly will want to
invest their money in the right of decisionmaking and thus, will benefit under
the informed consent model.8 9
86. J. KATZ, supra note 3, at 227-28.

87. See Martyn, supra note 10, at 342.
88. See, e.g., B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS (1970) (probing
problems in availability of legal services based on findings of American Bar Association Special
Committee); B. CURRAN & K. ROSICH, DATA MANUAL FOR THE SURVEY OF THE LEGAL NEEDS
OF THE PUBLIC (1980) (analyzing data from the American Bar Foundation and the American Bar
Association Special Committee); Stein, Legal Services and the Middle Class, 53 N.D.L. REV. 573,
580 (1977) (discussing problems with providing quality legal services to middle class consumers).
89. See infra notes 130-147 and accompanying text.
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In the above sections this Essay has argued that the three justifications for
attorney decisionmaking are not supportable. The assumption that attorneys act
in the best interests of the client and make inherently better decisions is questionable at best. Moreover, neither professional autonomy nor efficiency are
necessarily valued goals; in any event, neither will be sacrificed by client

decisionmaking.
However, these are reasons why the traditional justifications for allocating
decisionmaking authority to the attorney are not persuasive. The question thus

arises: Are there reasons for giving such authority to the client? The next section introduces the argument for informed consent based on autonomy.
III.
A.

THE ARGUMENT FOR CLIENT DECISIONMAKING:

AUTONOMY

The Value of Autonomy

This section presents the deontological 90 and utilitarian arguments 91 in
favor of client decisionmaking. On deontological principles client decisionmaking is an inherent good because it recognizes individual dignity and personhood,
and the right of self-determination. In other words, informed consent enhances
autonomy, and all the rights that inure in that concept. On the other hand, a
utilitarian would argue that informed consent is beneficial to both client and
society: the process of deciding for oneself increases one's personal happiness
and well being.
1. The Deontological Approach: Autonomy as a Good in Itself
The primary justification for informed consent is the principle of autonomy.
This principle denotes the ability to make choices about one's life; it is the
right of self-determination. It is a value endorsed both by religious 92 and secu90. The origin of deontology can be found in the writings of Immanuel Kant. See I. KANT,
GROUNDING FOR THE METHAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1981). Deontologists believe that
on the basis of a priori assumptions that individuals have certain human rights and that it
is the role of the lawyer to help preserve and protect them. This makes particular behavior
of lawyers appropriate quite without regard to what the effect is on the general happiness
or well being produced by asserting the rights.
T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 17 (3d ed. 1984).
91. Utilitarianism is associated with David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill. See
J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1876); D.
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (1888); J. MILL, UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, ESSAY
ON BENTHAM (1962). See generally T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 20-55 (1979) (analyzing the moral principles applicable to biomedicine); P. RAMSEY, THE
PATIENT AS PERSON (1970) (examining present day problems in medical ethics). "The utilitarian
thinker asks how particular conduct affects people's happiness and well being. If more well being is
generated by one course of behavior than another, then that course of behavior is preferable." T.
MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 90, at 16.
92. For example, Pope John XXIII wrote:
The dignity of the human person ...requires that every man enjoy the right to act freely
and responsibly. For this reason ... man should exercise his rights, fulfill his obligations,
and in the countless forms of collaboration with others, act chiefly on his own responsibility and initiative. This is to be done in such a way that each one acts on his own decision,
of set purpose and from a consciousness of his obligation, without being moved by force or
pressure brought to bear on him externally.

1987]

ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

lar 93 scholars and is a basic precept of Anglo-American law.94 It has been de-

scribed as "one of our highest social values."'9 5 Indeed, "[o]ne might reasonably
claim that the most humane principle advanced by the post-theistic West is that
of personal human autonomy."' 96 Liberal society emphasizes concern for the
individual; autonomy is a central value articulating and embodying that

concern.
Why is autonomous decisionmaking so valued? Making our own decisions
affirms our sense of personhood-it tells us who we are. It allows individuals to
apply their own value hierarchy and to determine, often in a literal sense, the
future course of their lives. As philosopher Gerald Dworkin explains:
We desire to be recognized by others as the kind of creature capable of
determining our own destiny. Our own sense of self-respect is tied to
the respect of others .... [N]otions of creativity, risk-taking, of adherence to principle, of responsibility, are all linked conceptually to the
possibility of autonomous action. These desirable features of a good
life are not possible (logically) for nonautonomous creatures. In general, autonomy is linked to activity, to making rather than being, to
those higher forms of consciousness that are distinctive of human
97
potential.
Making one's own choices is particularly justified when questions of values
are implicated, as they are in the legal system, and when the decisions affect a
person's life as substantially as those matters in which an attorney typically is
involved. Lawsuits resolve disputes over property or contractual rights, define
fault and negligence and hence, obligation, determine privacy interests, and in
the case of criminal suits, decide questions of liberty and life. It is difficult to
conceive of situations in which the right to decide one's own fate is more fundamentally implicated. 98
Thus, absent any utilitarian justification-and even assuming that an expert
(or a computer) could make better decisions than the client-informed consent
is justified. As the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research concluded:
[T]he values underlying [informed consent] are not merely legal artifacts. Rather, they are deeply embedded in American culture and the
Freedman, PersonalResponsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH. U.L. REv. 191, 191 (1977)
(quoting PACEM IN TERRIS, Encyclical Letter of Pope John XXIII, para. 34 (Apr. 11, 1963)).
93. See R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 7-9; J. KATZ, supra note 3, at 104-21.
94. See 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 4, at 17.
95. C. LIDZ, supra note 70, at 10.

96. White, Informed Consent: Ambiguity in Theory, Practice, 8 J. HEALTH, POL., POL'Y &
LAW 99, 101 (1983).
97. Dworkin, Autonomy and Informed Consent, in 3 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS,
supra note 4, at 63, 74.
98. Dworkin makes an analogous argument in the medical field:
First, one's body is irreplaceable and inescapable. If my architect doesn't listen to me and
this results in a house I do not like, I can always move. I cannot move from my body. In
addition, since my body is me, failure to respect my wishes concerning my body is a particularly insulting denial of autonomy.
Dworkin, supra note 97, at 75.
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American character; they transcend partisan ideologies and the politics
of the moment. Fundamentally, informed consent is based on respect

for the individual, and in particular, for each individual's capacity and
right both to define his or her own goals and to make choices designed
to achieve those goals. 99

2. The Utilitarian Approach: Autonomy Enhances Personal
Happiness and Satisfaction

Principles of utility also justify informed consent: informed consent will
maximize benefits to everyone in society, including attorneys, clients, and the
legal institutions themselves. 1°° Rules of consent serve to protect attorneys and
clients from misunderstandings that arise from a failure to communicate.10 1 Informed consent helps allay public fears and skepticism about the legal profession

that currently exist, particularly among indigent defendants.10 2 "[T]o force a
lawyer's decisions on a defendant 'can only lead him to believe that the law

contrives against him.' "103 Furthermore, informed consent encourages selfscrutiny by attorneys; they are compelled, individually and collectively, to evaluate the appropriate relationship between attorney and client. 1° 4 Finally, in-

formed consent maximizes the well being of society because it reaffirms the value
and validity of autonomy. All of society benefits when the ideals of autonomy
are heralded, rather than subverted, by the legal profession. Adoption of informed consent, in other words, revitalizes the general commitment to the concept of autonomy. As Professors Beauchamp and Childress relate, "to the

extent violations of autonomy are institutionally condoned, we all stand to suffer, because the right to make such choices will in general be impaired or even

105
eliminated by this institutional arrangement."
Furthermore, autonomous decisionmaking is desirable from a utilitarian
perspective because it best assures that individual preferences will be maximized.
Client control makes it more likely that the resulting choices will be satisfying.

Given the frequent absence of objective criteria, and the legitimate subjective

preferences of clients, ascertaining whether a particular course of action will
06
promote a client's well being is a matter of individual judgment.
99. 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 4, at 16-17.
100. Cf. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 91, at 64 (informed consent in medicine
will protect and benefit everyone in society).
101. The practical effect may be a reduced amount of legal malpractice litigation. See Martyn,
supra note 10, at 346; cf.Bettman, The Issue of Informed Consent, 27 SURV. OPTHALMOLOGY 133,
133 (1982) (informed consent creates bond that makes patient willing to accept an unfortunate outcome; it eliminates surprise and the anger that most often causes patients to sue).
102. See Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, I1 J. CONFLICT REs. 52, 67 (1967)
(indigent clients mistrust appointed counsel).
103. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 762 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975)).
104. See Martyn, supra note 10, at 345 (informed consent in medicine has caused a number of
doctors and medical schools to re-examine the entire physician-patient relationship).
105. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 91, at 64; see also White, supra note 96, at 116
(benefit to informed consent independent of any effect on medicine that may exist; there is a "value
to society in keeping alive such notions as autonomy and the right to self-determination").
106. See, e.g., D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING & COUNSELING: A CLIENT-
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Furthermore, individuals express more satisfaction in their own decisions
for the simple reason that they made the decision. In other words, the process of
deciding for oneself-even if others could have made the same choice-leads to

increased satisfaction with the result. 10 7 For example, studies in the medical
field suggest that
patients knowledgeable about their condition and involved in the decisionmaking process are likely to emerge from therapy in better health.
A number of recent studies indicate that informed patients tend toward greater compliance with certain therapeutic regimens, reduced
levels of anxiety, faster recovery from surgery, and enhanced ability to

protect their own well-being.

B.

.... 108

The Implication of Autonomy for Decisionmaking

The above section indicates that autonomy is good in and of itself and that
it leads to desirable results. A desire to achieve autonomy does not, however,

resolve the question of who should make what decisions. For one thing, autonomy is a vague notion and it may be difficult to determine exactly what is a
client's "autonomous" choice. For example, what if the attorney identifies a
conflict between a client's "autonomous" wish to win the lawsuit, and a client's
CENTERED APPROACH 153 (1977) (legal decisions rest on some imprecise accounting concept of

what factors, on balance, emerge as important to client); D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 12, at 29-61
(study found clients who actively participate get significantly better results than those who delegate
to attorney); cf. C. LITz, supra note 70, at 11 (only patients have access to certain personal information necessary to medical decisionmaking); Shultz, supra note 73, at 292-93 ("Neither experts nor
society can judge what is best for an individual better than the individual herself ....
[Assuming
adequate information is provided by the doctor,] patient-made decisions should generally yield outcomes that are preferable as evaluated by the.., patient."); Note, Informed Consent and the Dying
Patient,83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1646 (1974) ("Only the patient knows sufficiently his own value preferences, capacity for pain and suffering, future business and social plans, and religious beliefs to evaluate the desirability of a particular treatment so it will maximize the patient's satisfaction.").
107. See G. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 60 (1983) (lack of involvement in and control over their own cases reduces clients' satisfaction with outcome); Maute, supra
note 10, at 1051 n.2. Moreover, studies support the position that individual participation and
decisionmaking make it more likely that individuals comply with the result. For example, one study
of consensual dispute resolution in small claims court found that
the very act of choosing to accept a settlement that might have been rejected may generate
pressures that favor compliance. Agreement may, in effect, reinstitutionalize legal norms
at the personal level..., adding guarantees of personal honor to the formal guarantees of
law. Also, pressures toward cognitive consistency, as suggested by a variety of social-psychological theories ... , may lead one to structure later behavior in accordance with prior
commitments, as may the possibility of embarrassment.
McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18
LAW & Soc'Y REv. 11, 43 (1984).
The dissatisfaction experienced particularly by criminal defendants is linked directly to their
lack of participation in the process. For example, studies indicate that a large part of indigent defendants' dissatisfaction stems from the feeling that "they were treated as objects, manipulated by
their lawyer in conjunction with the prosecutor." Mazor, supra note 31, at 1138. The fact attorneys
can disregard their clients' wishes exacerbates the clients' suspicion of their attorneys. Jones, 463
U.S. at 762 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. Roter, PatientParticipationin the Patient-ProviderInteraction: The Effect of Patient Question Asking on the Quality of Interaction,Satisfaction & Compliance,
5 HEALTH EDUC. MONOGRAPHS 281 (1977) (study demonstrated that patients who receive more
information and are free to ask questions are more satisfied with care).
108. 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 4, at 69-70.
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"autonomous" refusal to argue a certain defense? Which "autonomous" choice
deserves respect?
It is possible, moreover, that preserving autonomy in the long run may require parental-type intervention in the short run. The classic example is that of
Homer's Odysseus. Before Odysseus sailed by the Island of the enchanting Sirens he had his men bind him to the mast and swear not to release him. Odysseus feared the Sirens, who used beautiful music to draw sailors to their death.
Hearing the bewitching music of the Sirens, Odysseus demanded his release
from the mast. His crew, in refusing to release him, were acting parentalistically. However, in responding to Odysseus' earlier request, and saving his life,
they obviously preserved his autonomy.
This Essay contends that autonomy establishes a presumption in favor of
client decisionmaking over all aspects of the lawsuit. The value of autonomy
does not diminish simply because it is a "means" decision being made. To the
contrary, as argued earlier, the strategic choices often are the very decisions
clients feel most strongly about. At a minimum, the goal of autonomy requires
that clients have the choice whether to care about the means. Those strategic
decisions that do not evoke concern from the client likely will be delegated to the
attorney.
This presumption in favor of autonomy rests on a belief that, with appropriate information, clients are capable of reaching a rational decision. Only in the
rare situation in which the client is incapacitated or incompetent will parentalistic intervention be necessary. In other words, weak parentalism is only rarely
justified; strong parentalism should never be acceptable. The factual basis for
the belief that clients are capable of reaching a rational decision will be demonstrated in the next section. 9
Given that there rarely is a "right or wrong" answer, and that even the
"best" decision often is impossible to determine, the "rational" choice need not
be the one the lawyer would have made. The fact the lawyer believes that the
client is making the wrong decision is, therefore, irrelevant. The attorney's duty
is to explain the various legal issues adequately and to accept the client's
resolution.
Admittedly, autonomy is not absolute, but merely establishes a presumption for client decisionmaking. There are other values reflected in concerns for
professional autonomy and efficiency that may override the client's right to decide. First, as discussed earlier, the client should not have the right to force an
attorney to act illegally or unethically. 110 Autonomy is the right to self-determination; it must be limited when it infringes on another's rights so severely. Second, efficiency, in a narrow sense, may restrict autonomy. As previously
discussed, there may be rare situations in which the legal process itself is jeopardized by client decisionmaking, or in which the attorney truly cannot inform
109. See infra notes 124-129 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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the client and gain consent for compelling efficiency reasons. In such circumstances, the attorney should be given decisionmaking authority.
Third, there may be other values that outweigh autonomy. For example, it
may be decided that the societal desire to convict only guilty people is more
important than autonomy. Thus, if autonomy results in more innocent people
being convicted, due to poor client choices, increased client decisionmaking
should be re-examined. The next section addresses this final concern.
IV.

INFORMED CONSENT: CAN RESPECTING AUTONOMY WORK?

A theory of informed consent attempts to promote both autonomy and rational decisionmaking. For such a theory to work there must be adequate and
accurate communication between attorney and client. The client must understand the information, and he or she must make an informed choice free from
coercion. This final section attempts to demonstrate that clients are capable of
making voluntary and rational choices.
A.

The Communication Imperative: The Danger of Information Distortion
and Coercion

The theory of informed consent assumes there will be a meaningful exchange of material information, so that the client can make an accurate assessment of the risks and benefits of the available choices. Certainly, the attorney is
not obliged to tell the client everything; the client realistically cannot be provided the equivalent of a law school education. The precise information that the
attorney must divulge depends on the particular decision under consideration.
For most issues the discussion would focus on the "classical" elements of disclosure: risks and benefits of alternative courses of action.11 1 Obviously, this general formula leaves much discretion with the attorney.
The efficacy of disclosure thus depends on the circumstances and spirit in
which it is given.11 2 One fear is that the attorney will, for a number of reasons,
provide either incomplete information, or present the information in such a way
as to coerce the client into a predetermined choice. In either event, the goals of
autonomy and rational decisionmaking are subverted.
111. See C. LIDZ, supra note 70, at 12 (physicians must disclose the nature of the procedure, its
benefits and risks, and any possible alternatives); cf. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (relatively remote consequences of medical treatment may have to be disclosed if they
pose a chance of death or disablement). Some state statutes have attempted to identify more specifically the information physicians must disclose. For example, Colorado's informed consent law required physicians to tell the "likelihood" of death or injury from a procedure and provided that
"likelihood means an approximationof the percentage within two percent of the risk associated with
the procedure ....
Act of Apr. 30, 1976, ch. 88, § 1, 1976 Colo. Sess. Laws 522, 523, repealedby
Act of May 27, 1977, ch. 190, § 1, 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 799, 799. The mathematical requirement
"proved [an] unworkable practice and the law was repealed within a year of passage." J. LUDLAM,
supra note 5, at 49.
112. See Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITr. L. REv. 137, 164-77
(1977) (discussing the disclosure standards of informed consent). See generally Thompson, supra
note 66 (detailing social psychological research about people's responses to different methods of
disclosure).
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1. The Reasons for Information Distortion
The attorney's personal interests may endanger full and open disclosure.
Perhaps most significantly, the attorney's antipathy towards informed client
consent may cause the attorney either to hold back information he or she believes the client cannot comprehend, or shade the information to ensure that the
client reaches the decision deemed appropriate by the attorney. Similarly, certain financial conflicts of interest between the attorney's needs and the client's
may discourage full communication. For example, an attorney working on a
contingent or a fixed fee basis may not want to take the time necessary to disclose material information about various choices the client faces. In such a situation, the time spent gains no additional compensation for the attorney.
In essence, the conflicts of interest that cause doubt about attorney decisionmaking in the first place may be recast as reasons why informed consent
does not really ensure client choice. So long as the attorney controls the information, the attorney controls the choice.
2.

Possible Answers

The fear that attorneys may, either purposely or inadvertently, use their
ability to control information to coerce their clients' choices is a troubling one.
Certainly, society expects and wants attorneys to try to persuade their clients to
accept what the attorney believes is the wisest course of action. The line between persuasion and coercion is a difficult, yet important one to draw. Persuasion respects the right of an individual to make choices; coercion undermines an
individual's autonomy.
Given the often subtle nature of coercion, it may be impossible to know its
true extent. It is important, however, to keep in mind that information flow
need not be perfect for informed consent to be justified. As Bernard Barber
notes:
[Informed consent does] not require some utopian, impossible, or unreal consent process. In the real and morally satisfactory world, informed consent is a matter of more rather than less, of better rather
than worse, of the search for improvement rather than of the commit113
ment to formalized and inadequate consent.
In any event, the concern about inadequate and biased information may be
exaggerated. First, the experience of the medical profession empirically reveals
that, despite doctors' original dislike of the concept of informed consent,' 14 sig113. B. BARBER,

INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICAL THERAPY AND RESEARCH 10 (1980).
114. The medical profession's original antipathy towards informed consent is well known. Informed consent has been condemned by the medical profession as a myth and a fiction and even
made the subject of parodies designed to illustrate its absurdity. See C. LIDZ, supra note 70, at 10;
see, e.g., DeLee, Malpractice and Informed Consent-A Legal Ploy, 61 INT'L SURGERY 331, 332
(1976); Laforet, The Fiction of Informed Consent, 235 J. A.M.A. 1579, 1579 (1976); Ravitch, Informed Consent-Descent to Absurdity, MED. TIMES, Sept. 1983, at 164, 164. Criticism of informed
consent by doctors, at least measured by the written word, seems to be decreasing. See Shultz, supra
note 73, at 223 & n. 14 (noting that doctors have begun to recognize and accept patient demands for
more information and control).
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nificantly increased information flow between doctor and patient did occur. One
study, for example, showed that while only twelve percent of doctors told the
patient of a diagnosis of cancer before the imposition of an informed consent
requirement, now ninety-eight percent would disclose such information to
patients. 115
Second, despite the inherent conflicts between attorney and client, imposing
an informed consent requirement lessens the incentive for coercion. Under an
informed consent model the attorney would be liable based solely on the failure
to disclose material information adequately. One of the purposes of imposing a
rule of liability for providing incomplete or inaccurate information is to influence lawyers, as it has doctors. The doctor's potential liability has "spurred
valuable reassessment of ethical norms and professional practices and has made
'1 16
practitioners more sensitive to patients' needs and expectations."
In addition, sociological data suggests that the mere existence of a legal
requirement for informed consent affects the professional's attitudes and behavior. 117 In part, this is true because laws often change people's attitudes; people
become more accepting of the position advocated by the law or rule. In other
words, law serves an important function as a "moral teacher," both for the pro1 18
fessions and for the public.
Even when attitudes do not change, nonetheless, individuals may change
their behavior to conform to a new rule. Studies investigating the effect of judicial desegregation orders demonstrate that court decisions played a significant
role in the increased acceptance of integration.1 19 Even when attitudes did not
change, however, most individuals acted lawfully. 120 Research on the effect of
seat belt laws has reached similar results. 121 Thus, the conscious or subconscious desire to coerce the client may be minimized once the official legal stan115. See Warner, Should You Tell Your Patientsthe Truth?, 129 CANADIAN MED. A.J. 278, 280
(1983); accord 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 4, at 76 n.14 (in 1961 90% of
physicians preferred not to tell their patients; today 97% disclose cancer diagnoses). The current
status of informed consent in the medical profession admittedly is far from perfect. See, eg., C.
LIDZ, supra note 70, at 10; White, supra note 96, at 116. In many ways the implementation of
informed consent in the medical profession is more problematic than implementation in the legal
field. For one thing, there exists in medicine the "therapeutic privilege," which frees physicians from
a legal duty to disclose if withholding information is beneficial for the patient. See Comment, Informed Consent: The Illusion ofPatientChoice, 23 EMORY L.J. 503, 503-04 (1974). In other words,
the doctor may withhold information if disclosure would cause the patient's physical or mental
condition to deteriorate. See Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a
Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 WIs. L. REv. 413, 460-470
(discussing scope of therapeutic privilege). Whatever the validity of the therapeutic privilege in
medicine, there exists no corresponding fear in law that disclosure will so "frighten" the client as to
risk loss of life or severe psychological depression. Thus, the extent of disclosure in the legal field
can be expected to be greater than that which currently exists in medicine.
116. 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 4, at 151.
117. See B. BARBER, supra note 113, at 33.
118. 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 4, at 151.
119.

See M. BERGER, EQUALITY BY STATUTE: LEGAL CONTROLS OVER GROUP DISCRIMINA-

TION 176-77 (1952).

120. Id. at 179.
121. See Fhan6r & Hane, Seat Belts: Opinion Effects ofLaw-Induced Use, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 205 (1979) (compulsory seatbelt law increased frequency of seatbelt usage from approximately 30% to 80%).
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dard changes. The ideals of enhancing autonomy and self-determination
theoretically should be especially appealing to attorneys. Additional education,
moreover, may help attorneys accept, and hopefully embrace, the concept of
informed consent. Courses exploring the process of communicating with the
client can help acclimate new attorneys to the importance of client autonomy.
In addition, structural changes in the legal profession can decrease the incentive to coerce the client. The ABA Code of Professional Ethics Disciplinary
Rule 7-104(A) currently prohibits an attorney from communicating with a party
known to be already represented by another attorney. Therefore, a person represented by Attorney A cannot also consult with Attorney B on the same matter, unless Attorney A consents.1 22 Changing this rule to allow clients to
"check" the accuracy and completeness of information would encourage attorneys to be forthright in order to stay employed. In essence, clients could obtain
"second opinions" on those decisions that matter to them. Although, for cost
reasons, a client would likely seek second opinions only for a small number of
critical decisions, the attorney obviously would not know in advance which decisions the client will check. Accordingly, there would be a strong incentive for
attorneys to disclose fully and accurately the risks and benefits for all choices.
Finally, even if an attorney were to attempt to coerce the client, the attempted coercion may have little influence when important consequences are 123
at
stake, or when the client has a clear preference for one choice over another.
In other words, when a client feels strongly about a certain issue or course of
conduct, the attorney's attempt to influence the client unduly may be least effective. It is, of course, these deeply held beliefs that most significantly implicate
autonomy concerns.
B. Is ParentalismJustified: Can the Client Understand the Information?
A core assumption of the parentalism theory is that the client is inherently
incapable of understanding "technical" information. The analogous positionthat patients cannot understand medical information-was a core argument
against informed consent in medicine. Although opponents of informed consent
frequently-and vehemently-make the argument, 1 24 it has not been tested adequately. On the contrary, the research that does exist suggests that clients-and
patients-can understand the information needed to make a rational decision.
Even if certain technical information is beyond the reach of the average layperson, such information often is not needed in reaching a rational medical or legal
decision. In the medical field, for example, patients can understand that a pro122. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits an attorney from communicating
with a "party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent
of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so." MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1980); see Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1033 (1982).
123. See Thompson, supra note 66, at 110-11.
124. Shultz, supra note 73, at 292 n.321 (perhaps core objection to proposals strengthening patient choice is fear of poorer health); see Helfand, UnderstandingHow Physicians Think- Medical
Decisionmaking and Informed Consent, THE PHAROS, Fall 1983, at 31, 31.
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posed procedure has a certain survival rate and possible side effects, even though
they may not understand the methodology behind the studies or the physiology
of the side effects. Similarly, a client can understand that impeaching an alibi
witness has certain risks without understanding the precise workings of the rules
permitting impeachment.
Even doctors believe that patients can understand medical information if
reasonable time and effort is taken to explain the information. In one survey,
forty-eight percent of the doctors reported that ninety to one hundred percent of
their patients could understand the information necessary to make a decision; an

additional thirty-four percent believed that seventy to eighty percent
of their
25

patients could adequately comprehend the necessary information.1
More importantly, evidence indicates that it is the professional's poor communication skills that frustrate comprehension. Attorneys are accustomed to
speaking to other experts who "speak the same language," and they may not
explain legal concepts coherently to lay persons. Most clients would be capable
of understanding the risks and benefits of a particular decision if the issues were
126

explained in "plain English" and not legal jargon.

The desire to speak and write in convoluted, complicated "legalese" is

partly a reflection of poor teaching in law school, and partly an attempt to maintain the mystique of the profession. 127 Ridding the legal profession of "legalese"
may be a worthwhile goal in itself. Once informed consent becomes required,
law schools and continuing legal education programs likely will respond, as did

medical schools, by providing courses on the subject of effective communication.
Studies on the effect of informed consent in the medical profession demonstrate

not only that schools increasingly are teaching the skills necessary for effective
communication with patients, but that such courses significantly enhance doc-

tors' interpersonal skills. 2 8 One researcher, after reviewing numerous studies,
125. 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 4, at 59.
126. Ogletree & Hertz, The Ethical Dilemmas of Public Defenders in Impact Litigation, 14
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 23, 38 (1986). Ogletree and Hertz relate that in their experience,
"defendants invariably do understand even subtle nuances of their legal situation, as long as the
explanation is presented in a clear and straightforward manner. When defendants fail to understand,
it is usually the fault of the attorney who has rushed through the explanation or has couched concepts in legalese." Id. For a discussion of attorneys' use of technical, convoluted language, see
Benson, The End of Legalesea The Game is Over, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 519 (1985).
Cf. J. KATz, supra note 3, at 92 ("The extent to which patients can understand medical knowledge is
at least an open question. Physicians have had too little experience communicating their esoteric
knowledge to patients to permit any conclusive answers."); Meisel & Roth, Toward an Informed
Discussion of Informed Consent: A Review and Critique of the EmpiricalStudies, 25 ARiz. L. REv.
265, 298-99 (1983) (discussing numerous studies and concluding that the primary reason for lack of
understanding is technical manner in which information is transmitted by doctors; one study concluded that language of five consent forms studied was at advanced undergraduate or graduate
level); Meisel & Roth, What We Do and Do Not Know About Informed Consent, 246 J. A.M.A. 2473,
2474 (1981) (patients do not understand because the language is too complex); Schrader, Does Your
Patient Need a PhD to Read Your Consent Form?, AORN, July 1980, at 15. (study on readability of
consent forms).
127. See Stark, Why Lawyers Can't Write, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1389, 1389-90 (1984) (poor writing
partly due to linguistic self-preservation; attorneys are letting everyone know they possess knowledge
nonlegal world does not possess).
128. Kaufman, Medical Education and Physician-Patient Communication, in 3 MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 4, at 117, 137. As of 1982 60% of the law schools in this
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concluded: "Objective assessments of the communication skills of physicians all
suggest that intensive training in physician-patient communication results in behavioral change among physicians .... The studies reviewed above all suggest
that communication skills can be taught to students in medical school as well as
to interns and residents." 129
C.

Voluntary Consent: The Problem of Deference and Waiver

Autonomy is furthered under the informed consent model only by a knowing and voluntary consent. One problem that may detract from the voluntariness of the consent has already been discussed: the presentation of information
so as to coerce a certain decision from the client. But even absent any coercion,
it is possible that clients will defer to their attorney's judgment, or will waive the
right to make decisions in advance.
1. The Reasons for Deference and Waiver
There are several reasons why clients may not want to make decisions for
themselves. First, clients may subscribe to the parentalistic assumptions that
they cannot understand legal complexities and legal jargon sufficiently and that
attorneys, therefore, make better decisions.130 Furthermore, some, like Dostoevski's Grand Inquisitor, believe that people want to defer to authority figures,
so as to lighten the burden of decisionmaking:
And men rejoiced at being led like cattle again, with the terrible gift of
freedom that brought them so much suffering removed from them.
Tell me, were we right in preaching and acting as we did? Was it not
our love for men that made us resign ourselves to the idea of their
impotence and lovingly try to lighten the burden of their responsibilities, even allowing their weak nature to sin, but with our
permission. 131
Or, as surgeon Richard Seizer describes in medical terms, the patient becomes
like a child, and the doctor the "daddy":
When I try to call the patient in on a consultation, and say "which
alternative would you prefer?" invariably the patient says, "what do
you mean, which alternative? I want you to tell me what to do, you're
the doctor." The only unspoken word is daddy; tell me what to do,
country already offered courses that trained students in effective interviewing or counseling techniques. See Peck, A New Tort Liabilityfor Lack of Informed Consent in Legal Matters, 44 LA. L.
REv. 1289, 1292 & n. 16 (1984). Loyola Law School, for example, requires all students to take a four
credit course, entitled Ethics, Counseling, and Negotiations, that provides significant simulation experience and allows students to practice their communication skills. Were informed consent the
norm, law schools presumably would place increased emphasis on courses in effective communication. Cf Kaufman, Medical Education and Physician-Patient Communication, in 3 MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supranote 4, at 131 (despite some resistance, courses in interviewing and
communication are becoming increasingly frequent in the standard curricula of most medical

schools).
129. Kaufman, supra note 128, at 137.
130. See Katz, supra note 112, at 142 (all human beings struggle with impulses both to maintain

and to surrender their autonomy).
131. F. DOSTOEVSKI, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOv 309 (1880)
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daddy. When a person is desperately ill or frightened, there is a certain kind of regression
that makes you want to place yourself in some132
one's loving care.
Finally, clients who pay by the hour may decide to defer to attorney decisionmaking or to waive the right to make decisions because of concerns about costs.
Allowing the client to decide often means greater consultation time, more hours
billed, and hence, increased costs to the client. Some clients may prefer not to
make a decision rather than pay the increased costs.
2. Possible Answers
Admittedly, some clients do not want to make any legal decisions and
would want to waive all rights to all decisionmaking under an informed consent
doctrine. Thus, attorney and client may want to enter into a contract giving the
attorney the right to make all strategic decisions.
1 33
Perhaps the best solution would be to prohibit such blanket waivers.
The right to make one's own decisions could be determined to be an "inalienable" right that may never be waived or transferred by possession. Other rights
have been deemed so essential to "personhood" or so inherent to the "structure
of a decent society" that waiver of such rights is not permitted. 134 For example,
the Supreme Court has held the thirteenth amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude inalienable, both because servitude is offensive to basic concepts of personhood and because it is incompatible with a free society. 135 Thus,
because a blanket waiver would violate notions of personhood and subvert ideals
of self-determination, the client would be unable to waive contractually the right
to make all decisions.
Such an approach may be parentalistic, but it may be a minimal intrusion
necessary to achieve autonomy in the long run. In essence, it is a temporary
intervention, occurring solely to ensure both voluntary and rational decisionmaking. In other words, a person cannot knowingly and intelligently waive the
right to make all decisions at the institution of the lawsuit because he or she
cannot know with any precision what choices will arise-the client does not
know what rights he or she is giving up. Essentially, what is being prohibited is
only the client's right to decide in advance that he or she wants no decisionmaking power. This simply means that each issue must be brought before the
36
client. 1
132. Interview with R. Seizer, I NEw HAVEN MAGAZINE 37 (1983), quoted in J. KATZ, supra
note 3, at 126.
133. Spiegel, supra note 9, at 82 n.160 (blanket waiver at beginning of relationship should be
void); cf Meisel, supra note 115, at 453-60 (discussing waiver issue in medical context).
134. McConnell, The Nature and Basis of InalienableRights, 3 LAW & PHIL. Q. 25 (1984); see
Kreimer, Allocation Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L.
REv. 1293, 1387 (1984).
135. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
136. John Stuart Mill, a great opponent of paternalism, supported imposed conversation in some
situations: "Considerations to aid his judgment, exhortations to strengthen his will, may be offered
to him, even obtruded on him by others. Only after such an enforced conversation must individual
men and women be allowed to be the 'final judge' ..
" J. MILL, supra note 57, at 21-22; cf J.
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What happens, however, when the client truly does not want to make a
particular decision? For example, consider the following dialogue:
Attorney: We have to decide whether to move to strike the deposition testimony. That involves the following questions...
Client interrupts: I really don't care-you decide.
At this point should the client be forced to give of his or her time and
money to hear an issue that does not concern the client? The answer should be
that so long as this waiver is knowing and voluntary, the client should be able to
decide not to decide. In other words, the court must ensure that, as with any
waiver of rights, the waiver is voluntary, that it is an "intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege"; 137 that it represents "consensual, 'free choice' ... [reflecting] the individual's freedom to forego benefits or
safeguards through the uncoerced exercise of his rational faculties. ' 138
For the waiver to be voluntary and knowing, there must be some obligation
on the attorney at this juncture to tell the client the impact of the decision:
What does it mean to strike the deposition? What risks are involved? If the
client still wishes not to decide, an effective "waiver" then may be found.1 39
In the final analysis, the number of people who would defer to the attorney,
or who would want to waive the right of decisionmaking, is probably small.
Studies in the medical field reveal that patients want decisionmaking responsibility.140 In one survey, for example, seventy-two percent of the public stated that
they would prefer to make decisions jointly with the doctor after being informed
of the different alternatives. 14 ' What is interesting to note is that eighty-eight
percent of the doctors believed that patients wanted doctors to choose the best
alternatives for them.142 Studies such as those led the President's Commission
considering informed consent in health care to conclude: "Although subcultures differ in their views about autonomy and individual choice ... the Commission found a universal desire for information, choice, and respectful
143
communication about decisions."
The numerous cases that now arise in which the client attempts to direct
the attorney's choices demonstrate that people want the "burden" of legal decisionmaking.144 Furthermore, once informed consent becomes the norm, the atKATz, supra note 3, at 122-25 (forced dialogue, although perhaps a form of paternalism, may be

necessary to show respect for patient's self-determination).
137. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
138, Tigar, Forward: Waiver of ConstitutionalRights Disquietin the Citadel 84 HARV. L. REv.
1, 8 (1970).
139. A cautious practitioner would memorialize the voluntariness of the waiver, perhaps with
prepared consent forms.
140. 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 4, at 46; see also B. BARBER, supra note
113, at 28 (patients want more equality and desire informed consent); Denny, Williamson & Penn,
Community Medicine: Informed Consent-Emotional Responses of Patients, 60 POSTGRADUATE
MED. 205, 209 (1976) (only 7% of the patients in study did not want information about risks and
benefits of surgery).
141.
142.
143.
144.

1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 4, at 46.
1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 4, at 46.
1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 4, at 2 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 14, 17, 19, 21, 23 & 37-38 and accompanying text; cf. Roter, supra note 107
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titudes of the client, like those of the attorney, likely will change. Informed
consent affirms the individual's capability to make decisions; more importantly,
it gives one the right to do so. Once clients possess the right to impose on attorneys' time, to ask questions, they will increasingly exercise that right. Current
economic literature demonstrates that bestowing rights-changing the starting
place in bargaining over rights-makes a significant difference. 145 In other
words, giving clients the right to decide makes it likely that they will exercise
those rights. As one study suggests: "If this evidence generalizes to real cases,
the assignment of legal rights could determine outcome more frequently than is
46
commonly supposed." 1
Ultimately, the possibility of waivers is not an argument against extending
the right of decisionmaking. As Professor Chemerinsky writes:
No one would argue that the fifth amendment's right against self-incrimination should be eliminated just because people often confess or
that the first amendment should be abolished because people often do
not exercise their rights of expression ....
Rights should be extended
because they reflect fundamental values which should be protected
147

CONCLUSION

In one sense, this Essay has a modest objective. Reserved for another time
is any discussion of the specific rules governing an informed consent model for
the legal profession. Thus, for example, this Essay intentionally does not discuss
the standards for determining attorney liability for providing the client with inadequate information. Of course, this Essay establishes parameters for deciding
what those rules should be: any such rules must respect individual autonomy
without placing undue weight on the values of parentalism, efficiency, or attorneys' interest in their craft.
In another sense, this Essay has an ambitious objective. It argues for a
significant-perhaps revolutionary-change in the overall functioning of the attorney-client relationship. The parentalistic assumptions currently governing
the nature of the relationship serve neither the interests of the attorney nor the
interests of the client. Recognition of, and respect for, the client's autonomythe client's right to decide-does more than just enhance the client's well being.
It also reaffirms a basic notion of Anglo-American law. Respect for clients' autonomy truly ensures that the legal system is just, not only in its results, but also
in its process.

(doctor-patient relationship is organized system of social behavior patients must learn in order to

negotiate for services; patients who receive some explanations from doctors respond with more questions than those who receive no explanation).
145. See Schwartz, The Enforceability ofSecurity Interests in ConsumerGoods, 26 J. L. & ECON.

117, 141 (1983).
146. Id. at 141 n.50.
147. Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 503, 556 (1985).

